Abstract

Picking Locks with Cryptology

Computer security and cryptology take much of their basic philosophy and language from the field of mechanical locksmithing, and yet we often ignore the possibility that physical security systems might suffer from the same kinds of vulnerabilities that plague computers and networks. This talk explores the relationship between mechanical locks and cryptology with an emphasis on how the abstract security models more usually associated with computing systems are also useful for analyzing and attacking physical security systems. We describe attacks against masker-keyed mechanical pin tumbler locks that exploit weaknesses remarkably similar to those found in badly-designed cryptographic protocols. We end with future directions for research in this area and the suggestion that mechanical locks are worthy objects of our attention and scrutiny.

A recent research paper on this subject is available online at: http://www.crypto.com/papers/mk.pdf

Short Bio:

Matt Blaze is a research scientist at AT&T Labs-Research and an associate professor of Computer and Information Sciences at the University of Pennsylvania. His research focuses on applications of cryptology in secure systems, trust management, security protocols, privacy and anonymity, and public policy issues relating to computer and network security. He holds a PhD in computer science from Princeton University, and is a member of the ACM, IACR, IEEE, and the Associated Locksmiths of America.

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