

Secure I/O Device Sharing among Virtual Machines on Multiple Hosts

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


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
I/O Device Disaggregation

- **Reduce Cost:** 1 device instead of each one per server.
- **Increase Utilization:** Accessible from every server.
- **Flexible and Scalable:** Easy to add/remove
- **Reliability:** Pool of devices to choose for backup.



Ladon: Software-based MR-SRIOV

- **Standard PCIe switch / SR-IOV endpoint:**
 - Without MR-IOV capability
 - Native driver / zero copy
- **Native Performance:**
 - Control path goes to a central authority
 - Direct data path to/from devices
- **Secure Sharing:**
 - Access control using existing technologies




Outline

- **Introduction**
 - I/O Virtualization (IOV)
 - SR-IOV v.s MR-IOV
 - NTB (Non-Transparent Bridge)
- **Ladon**
 - Architecture
 - Secure Mechanism
- **Performance**
 - Throughput / Latency

I/O Virtualization (IOV)


- **Direct communication:**
 - Direct assigned to VMs
 - Hypervisor bypassing
- **Physical Function (PF):**
 - Configure and manage the SR-IOV functionality
- **Virtual Functions (VFs):**
 - Lightweight PCIe function
 - With resources necessary for data movement



Applicable inside a single host (SR -> Single Root)

Single Root (SR) Architecture


- **Multi-CPU, one root complex hierarchies**
 - Today's motherboard architecture
 - Single PCIe hierarchy
- **Single Address Domain**
 - BIOS/System software probes topology
 - Partition and allocate resources
- **Each device owns a range (s) of physical address**
 - BAR addresses, MSI-X, and device ID



TB: Transparent Bridge

Multi Root (MR) Architecture

- **Interconnect multiple hosts**
 - Devices shared in the cluster
- **Enhanced switch/endpoints**
 - New switch silicon
 - New endpoint silicon
 - Management model
- **Solution**
 - **NTB** as isolation element between domains
 - Extend SR-IOV endpoints to multiple hosts



Non-Transparent Bridge (NTB)

- Isolation of two hosts or memory domains
 - Host stops PCI enumeration at NTB-D.
 - Yet allow status and data exchange
- Translations between domains
 - PCI device ID: Querying the ID lookup table (LUT)
 - Address: From primary side and secondary side





Figure: Multi-Host System and Intelligent I/O Design with PCI Express

NTB Address Mapping

- NTB address translation:
 - <the **primary** side to the **secondary** side>
- Configuration:
 - **Addr0** at primary side's BAR window to **Addr1** at the secondary side
- Example:
 - Addr0 = 0x8000 at BAR4 from **HostA**
 - Addr1 = 0x10000 at **HostB's** DRAM
- One-way Translation:
 - Read/write at Addr0 (0x8000) == read/write Addr1
 - Read/write at Addr0 does not translated to Addr1






*Ladon: a hundred-heads dragon
Who guards the Garden of Hesperides*




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System Components


- Management Host (MH)
 - Manage the shared I/O devices
- Compute Host (CH)
 - Non-virtualized host OS can directly access VF
 - Virtualized host with VMs can directly access VF
- Non-Transparent Bridge (NTB)
 - Each CH connects to the fabric via an NTB
- PCIe Switch & SR-IOV device
 - PF and multiple VFs



Prototype Implementation




Global Address Space Allocation




Per-Virtual NIC Configuration

- Virtual NIC is backed by a VF of an SRIOV NIC
- Identify the virtual NIC's CSR, MMIO, MSI-X and DMA payload area
- Install mappings in the BARs of the NTB port



Security Threats


Consider malicious VM and malicious CH



 VF1 is assigned to VM1 in CH1, but it can screw multiple memory areas.

Security Guarantees: Summary

- Inter-host
 - A VF can only access the CH it belongs to.
 - Accessing other hosts is blocked by other host's LUT & IOMMU
- Intra-host
 - A VF assigned to a VM can only access to memory assigned to the VM.
 - Accessing other VMs is blocked host's IOMMU
- Inter-VF / inter-device
 - A VF can not write to other VF's registers (MMIO).
 - Isolate by IOMMU in MH
- Compromised CH
 - Not allow to touch other CH's memory nor MH




Let's see some performance numbers!

EVALUATION


Video Available at : http://youtu.be/B_-GesOjkG0

Latency

- **SRIOV**: between VM in **MH** and remote test host
- **MRIOV**: between VM in **CH** and remote test host
- **MRIOV+**: between VM in **CH** and remote test host with zero-copy optimization



TCP RX Throughput



Conclusion


- A scalable PCIe-based system interconnect architecture
 - **Decouple** devices from CPU/memory in the motherboard
 - Open up a new design space for compute cluster
- A **secure** I/O device sharing scheme that
 - Leverages the address/ID translation schemes, such as EPT, BAR translation registers, IOMMU, LUT
 - Prevent unauthorized accesses to shared I/O devices
- A fully operational prototype
 - Demonstrates the feasibility and efficiency of the **software-based MR-IOV**
 - Virtually no throughput/latency penalty when compared with SRIOV.

Shalom!

THANK YOU

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
Multiple VMs and CHs



**Little unfairness
between CH and VM**

Optimization

- **Zero driver modification**
 - Driver on the CH only see CH's physical address space.
 - Solution: trapping the DMA access API.
- **Zero-copy**
 - Limited BAR size support in BIOS (between 3G-4G)
 - Solution: Mapping the entire CH's physical memory space to avoid copying.



Scalability / Compatibility

- How many CHs/VMs can Ladon support?
 - Each CH: 2 BARs for CSR and MMIO, 2 BARs for DMA and MSI-X
 - As many VMs as a CH could run
 - As many CHs as allowed by the PCIe switch
- How many SRIOV devices can Ladon shares?
 - As many as allowed by the PCIe switch
- Vendor-neutrality
 - Ladon only uses the basic features of NTB: address translation and LUT
 - Intel's on-board NTB: Xeon C5500/C3500